CHAOS AND TRENDS IN CURRENT BRAZILIAN SOCIETY
Nildo Viana
Brazilian society is experiencing a chaotic
situation and marches into the crisis and allows for different trends for the
future. The chaos emerged embryonic in 2012 and deepened in the following years.
The most visible moment was in 2013, when student demonstrations generated
popular demonstrations that brought together thousands of people, sparking
disputes within the dominant bloc and an institutional crisis that, in turn,
was reinforced and reinforced by the financial crisis. The slowdown in the pace
of capital accumulation led to even greater problems. The impeachment of Dilma
Roussef's neoliberal and neopopulist government heralded a recomposition of the
dominant bloc and a stronger, more defined position of the ruling class. The
new government would adopt the necessary policies (labor reform, etc.) to
resume the pace of capital accumulation, allowing a higher rate of exploitation
and other changes that would put the country back on track.
This, however, did not occur. This did not
occur due to several determinations. One is that the process of decelerating
the pace of capital accumulation could not be resumed overnight, and this would
require strong and competent government. The economic measures were modest and
the reforms that would be necessary to collaborate with this process took time
to be addressed and were quite unpopular. The Temer Government also sinned to
have formed a government of "allies", that is to say, composed of the
political forces that united to overthrow Dilma Roussef and for that reason
many ministries and the governmental team lacked more firmness and competence.
In addition, the government was born with problems of legitimacy and this
reinforced its weakness. The slowness in taking the necessary measures,
including waiting for the definitive impeachment, led to another obstacle to
recovering the pace of capitalist accumulation and also discrediting the
government.
Thus, the Temer government was slow and lacked
the competence to take more rapid and effective measures. After the definitive
impeachment, it advanced faster in the reforms and found the resistance not
only of the representatives and sympathizers of the ex-government, but also of
sectors of the youth. However, it continued with its action, but the judiciary,
which has become very autonomous in recent years, continued the investigation
of corruption and legal actions that ended up involving several sectors,
reaching the current government and neighborhood. This situation created new
political instability with the denunciations involving President Michel Temer.
In this context, the former governors try to revive themselves, without much
popular support. Brazil has an institutional situation in which it has neither
a stable government nor strong opposition. At the level of civil society, there
is no great reaction and the apathy of the workers' movement and workers in
general is the biggest problem of the moment and that makes the situation of
the country chaotic. The demonstrations that have been taking place are
depleted and even when there is some form of broader participation, such as the
national stoppage on April 28, it occurs only defensively, against the reforms
proposed by the government and without any alternative political project.
Chaos ensues when the state apparatus and
representative democracy face a crisis of legitimacy, internal disputes within
the dominant bloc dilacerate the government and further reduce its
effectiveness and legitimacy, the institutional opposition is fragile,
incompetent and powerless, and the process Of struggle, self-organization,
self-training, of workers is absent. The chaos installed allows the most
diverse solutions, as the tendencies and possibilities expand in this context.
The dominant bloc is disjointed, because if it had a minimum of competence and
articulation, it would have avoided this post-impeachment situation even more,
because the reforms were being directed to the benefit of the capitalist class
and responsibility was being played only for the Temer government. In this
context, a drastic solution can be made and already has sectors that share with
this possibility, the so-called "military intervention" to end the
reigning tumult. This possibility exists and since 2014 there are sectors of
the population defending this solution in street demonstrations. The more the
situation deteriorates and the longer it becomes, the more that possibility
becomes a trend.
This possibility coexists with another, which
is an institutional solution. The removal of the current government and new
elections (direct or indirect) could install a new government. This would give
a certain amount of breath and could proceed with actions towards a resumption
of the pace of capital accumulation ("economic growth"). For this to
happen, however, some struggles would be fought within the dominant bloc and
with the slowness that accompanies this in institutional politics, including
resistance from the Temer Government. An additional problem is the judiciary
and the so-called "Operation Lava Jet", because no one escapes
corruption, unless the investigation is limited. The judiciary and repressive
apparatus have become enthusiastic about their autonomization and are going too
far, so far that illegitimate governance and democracy are increasingly
discredited. That would be another obstacle to such a solution. Not all agents
of the historical process are aware of what they are doing and of the problems
they can create. Even on the same side, ignorance generates divisions and
problems, which is reinforced by more particular interests within the ruling
class. Some deluded point to a third possibility. The glorious return of Lula,
the former president of the Workers' Party. However, in addition to being
involved in corruption and accusations and trials are rising, as well as in
several others of his party, such as Dilma Roussef, his party no longer has any
significant support from the population. The Workers' CUT (CUT) and all civil
society organizations equipped by PT, even the MST (Landless Workers Movement)
disintegrate in the eyes of the population. The emptied demonstrations show
their total lack of legitimacy and popular support. The denunciations and
problems in all these organizations only reinforce the critical situation and
terminal stage of the PT. Even the attempt to unite the progressive bloc
(seeking support from the other leftist parties) did not produce any results,
not only because these are small parties and without great force, but also
because of their inoperability and resistance from the most extremist sectors.
The PT's bet and similar in identity politics (gender, etc.) show the emptiness
and distance of the progressive bloc from the majority of the population, both
from the privileged classes, increasingly antipetist[1],
when from the underprivileged classes, more and more Institutional politics.
Only the sectors linked to the PT and other forces of the progressive bloc and
sectors of the civil bureaucracy, intellectuals and members of social movements
co-opted by the old government that have not yet perceived defeat remain
supportive and fail to promote real opposition, (Parliamentary, state, etc.)
and civil society (pressure, demonstrations, etc.).
One last possibility would be the initiation of
a revolutionary struggle, which refers to the revolutionary bloc and the labor
movement. The revolutionary bloc could have developed from the demonstrations
of 2013, but eventually stagnated, partly because of the identity policies
encouraged by the PT and the like, partly because of the lack of political
formation and influence of poststructuralist ideologies ( Irrationalist and
anti-intellectualist) and the refusal of the organization of vast sectors of
youth from such influence. The apathy of the labor movement also reinforces
this process and facilitates this stagnation, with honorable exceptions, but
there is no point in casting fertile seeds on infertile grounds. The great
absence of the underprivileged classes and the fragility of the revolutionary bloc
put this possibility as remote.
However, just as no one predicted the emergence
of the workers' movement in various attempts at proletarian revolutions (from
the Paris Commune through various revolutionary experiences, not to mention
less radical but surprising struggles such as the June 2013 demonstrations in
Brazil itself), It may be that the unexpected manifests itself again.
Historical prediction fails because analysts generally observe latent and
visible trends rather than the dissatisfaction and discontent of broad sectors
of the population that can spontaneously explode into action at any moment. The
February Revolution in Russia, as well as the May 1968 in Paris, show these
processes and how, in times of hopelessness, hope rises concretely through
social struggles, especially proletarian struggles.
Nonetheless, this brings greater responsibility
to the revolutionary bloc, since it must contribute to the process of
self-organization and self-formation right now, so that the attempt, if it
occurs, has a better chance of being realized and overcoming the incompleteness
of proletarian revolutions. The revolutionary bloc is fragile for several
reasons. Although the demonstrations in 2013 pointed to its strengthening, the
policies of the Dilma Government, as well as the polarization created between
government supporters and oppositionists, which manifested itself electorally
in 2014 and strengthened in the following two years with the opposition between
governors and supporters of impeachment , Ended up impeding this process.
Polarization excluded the underprivileged classes from the debate, especially
the labor movement. The government's electoral contest, which almost ended in a
tie, was almost one-third absentee, which can be seen by the number of abstentions,
null votes and blank votes added. The polarization between governmentists and
institutional oppositionists took place politically as well as morally.
Conservative moralism and progressive moralism were at odds with each other and
within the various social movements had the effect, alongside the main
polarization, to divert much of the population from the class struggle to
questions of impeachment and corruption on the one hand, and questions Morals
(sexuality, etc.) on the other.
Another obstacle that the revolutionary bloc
encounters is, beyond the hegemony and cultural polarization derived from the
previous situation, the force of ideologies and conceptions, which generate a
real realm of subjectivism. The denial of reason - which manifests itself through
irrationalism, pragmatism and practicalism - together with the denial of
organization, drastically weaken the revolutionary bloc (especially youth
sectors, intellectuals, militants in general). Autonomism and anarchism show
their limits by expressing the influence of subjectivist ideologies and others
that do not contribute to a theoretical and organizational advance, as well as
the party left end up reproducing several of these ideological elements,
especially PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) and PSOL ( Party Socialism and
Freedom).
The revolutionary bloc can win with the
reemergence of the labor movement, but it should, before that, anticipate and
strengthen itself. In order for the revolutionary bloc to collaborate with the
self-organization and self-formation of the underprivileged classes and the
proletariat in particular, it would be necessary to strengthen, broaden
political articulation, increase the number of supporters and militants, and
overcome the ambiguities of some sectors (Including pulling away from other
political forces and getting caught up in hegemonic ideologies). In addition,
it would have to intensify and expand the cultural struggle (from theoretical
production, through artistic production, to the process of socialization of knowledge
and dissemination, especially generalized propaganda), revolutionary
intervention in civil society (social movements, , Universities, neighborhoods,
factories and companies, etc.) and to present a revolutionary strategy and a
political project of radical and total transformation of society as a whole.
The current situation creates some favorable conditions for this process, but
overcoming hegemony and certain ambiguities is necessary for this to occur. The
self-managed project should be the main banner of the revolutionary bloc's
struggle, not the simple refusal of government reforms.
If the revolutionary bloc fails to advance in
this direction, spontaneous struggles can advance and create a revolutionary
situation, not only would it not have contributed to this in favorable
conditions for victory, would have little capacity for intervention and prevent
counterrevolution, Either through state repression or through bureaucratization
or its weakening through a mere exchange of government. For this reason, it is
essential to encourage self-organization (commissions, associations, workers'
councils, neighborhood councils, etc.) and intellectual self-training (through
struggle and access to critical thinking and anticapitalist cultural
production). The possibility of a successful and finished proletarian
revolution has as one of its determinations the question of hegemony and the
strength of the social blocs, especially of the revolutionary bloc. So it needs
to go beyond and exceed its limits.
The future of Brazilian society is, in concrete
terms, uncertain, and, on the plane of consciousness, a box of surprises. That
is why it is fundamental to raise awareness to avoid surprises and to deepen
the action to reinforce the tendency that we want it to materialize.
[1]
Petism is the name given to PT (Workers' Party) supporters.
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Originally Posted:
https://medium.com/praxismag/caos-e-tend%C3%AAncias-na-sociedade-brasileira-atual-nildo-viana-82b1747e81fd
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